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Securities markets are quintessential complex adaptive systems in which heterogeneous agents
compete in an attempt to maximize returns. Species of trading agents are also subject to evolu-
tionary pressure as entire classes of strategies become obsolete and new classes emerge. Using an
agent-based model of interacting heterogeneous agents as a flexible environment that can endoge-
nously model many diverse market conditions, we subject deep neural networks to evolutionary
pressure to create dominant trading agents. After analyzing the performance of these agents and
noting the emergence of anomalous superdiffusion through the evolutionary process, we construct a
method to turn high-fitness agents into trading algorithms. We backtest these trading algorithms on
real high-frequency foreign exchange data, demonstrating that elite trading algorithms are consis-
tently profitable in a variety of market conditions—even though these algorithms had never before
been exposed to real financial data. These results provide evidence to suggest that developing ab
initio trading strategies by repeated simulation and evolution in a mechanistic market model may
be a practical alternative to explicitly training models with past observed market data.
I. INTRODUCTION
Ab initio artificial intelligence—algorithms that are
capable of learning or evolving master-level performance
from a zero-knowledge baseline on a task normally per-
formed by humans—is a long-held goal of the field in
general [1]. Recent years have seen substantial progress
toward this goal [1–3]. One particular area of inter-
est is the development of algorithms that are able to
trade financial assets without human supervision. The
difficulty of this problem is enhanced by its funda-
mentally stochastic nature unlike the deterministic non-
cooperative games of Go, chess, shogi, and Atari. of obvi-
ous economic incentives for intense competition amongst
candidate solution algorithms: if an algorithm has a non-
transient ability to make a statistically significant posi-
tive profit, the owner of that algorithm stands to reap
large financial gains.
Though there has been prior work on ab initio trading
strategies, such work has focused on small, homogeneous
collections of agents that interact over shorter timescales
than those considered in this study [4]. Trading strate-
gies that use statistical and algorithmic methods more
broadly are exceptionally common in the quantitative
finance literature [5–7], and are used in practice with
mixed results [8–10]. Evolutionary approaches to the
development of trading strategies have focused on deriva-
tion of technical trading rules using observed market data
as the training dataset and then backtesting the evolved
rules on out-of-sample test data. [11, 12]. Likewise, evo-
lutionary computation and agent-based models have been
used extensively to study the macro properties of artifi-
cial asset markets rather than specifically studying the
∗ david.dewhurst@uvm.edu
micro properties of individual trading strategies [13–19].
However, to our knowledge there has been no academ-
ic study of the possibility of developing in vivo trading
strategies using purely ab initio methods—trading strate-
gies that train or evolve using artificial data only, and
then, at test time, trade using real asset prices—which is
the approach that we take here.
We pursue this objective for two reasons: first, achiev-
ing this goal would be a useful step in the development
of evolutionary “self-play” techniques in the context of
stochastic games with many players [20–22]; and second,
this would demonstrate that the development of prof-
itable trading strategies could be realized by attempt-
ing to simulate with increasing accuracy the underlying
mechanisms of financial markets instead of by predicting
future real market prices.
The paper proceeds as follows: in Sec. II, we describe
the theory and details behind our agent-based financial
market model, including the design of the price-discovery
(auction) mechanism, heterogeneous agent population,
evolutionary algorithm (summarized graphically in Fig.
1), and method to convert evolved individuals into trad-
ing strategies; in Sec. III we summarize descriptive and
quantitative results of the evolutionary dynamics and the
performance of evolved trading algorithms backtested on
real data; and in Sec. IV we discuss these results and
provide suggestions for future work.
II. THEORY AND SIMULATION
Our simulation methodology is based on an agent-
based market model (ABM) composed of a matching
engine and heterogeneous agents, which we describe
presently [23]. We then outline the evolutionary mecha-
nism, how it interfaces with the ABM, and the method-
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2FIG. 1. At each generation g of the evolutionary process, we initialize K independent markets in which agents (Sec. II B)
interact via the matching engine described in Sec. II A. At the end of T timesteps, agents subject to evolution are pooled,
selection is applied, and then new agents are introduced using the mechanism described in Sec. II C. The process then begins
again in generation g + 1 and continues for a total of G generations.
ology by which we generate functional trading strategies
from evolved agents.
A. Details of price discovery mechanism
At each timestep t, agents can submit orders to the
matching engine, which attempts both to find an equi-
librium price for that timestep and to match orders with
one another so that exchange of shares for cash can occur.
Orders are described by a three-tuple, o = (s,N (o), X(o)),
consisting of the desired side s ∈ {buy, sell}, the number
of shares that the agent would like to purchase or sell
N (o), and the requested price at which the agent would
like to transact X(o). The matching engine collects all
orders submitted to it and matches bid orders with ask
orders using a frequent batch auction (FBA) mechanism
[24, 25]. This mechanism is an alternative to the con-
tinuous double auction (CDA) mechanism that is in use
in most securities markets. Both CDAs and FBAs are
double-sided auctions, meaning that they match multi-
ple buyers with multiple sellers of an asset at the same
time, unlike auctions that match a single seller with mul-
tiple buyers (e.g., English, Japanese, or Dutch auctions)
[26–28]. However, CDAs and FBAs differ fundamental-
ly as CDAs operate in continuous time and FBAs oper-
ate in discrete time. CDAs match orders as they are
received; if the order cannot be immediately executed, it
is placed into an order book where it waits to be matched
with a future incoming order. In contrast, an FBA col-
lects orders in discrete time trading intervals. At the
end of each trading interval, orders are sorted according
to price preference (bids are sorted from highest to low-
est price, while asks are sorted from lowest to highest).
Matching then occurs in price-time priority order, mean-
ing that bids with a higher price and asks with a lower
price are matched first. Ties in price are broken by age,
where older orders—orders that are already resting in
the orderbook from previous batches—are matched first
[29]. Orders submitted at timestep t that do not exe-
cute at timestep t remain in the orderbook for consider-
ation in future time periods. Orders that remain in the
orderbook—and hence are not matched with new, arriv-
ing orders—past a certain amount of time are considered
“stale” by the matching engine and are removed. In our
implementation, we set this period of time to be one day
(or 100 time increments). Agents are able to observe the
price Xt at time t and the volume of resting bid (b) and
ask (a) orders in the orderbook at price level x at time
t, written Db(x, t) and Da(x, t). All statistics used by
agents in calculating side of book, price level and num-
ber of shares to submit are functions of these observable
random variables and of the agents’ own internal state,
which we describe in the next section. We display an
example orderbook, along with the corresponding price
trajectory, in panel A of Fig. 2.
B. Heterogeneous agents
Our agent population is heterogeneous, comprised of
seven qualitatively distinct varieties (species) of agents
that analyze statistical behavior of asset prices different-
ly and concomitantly exhibit divergent trading behavior.
We do not apply evolutionary pressure to six out of sev-
en of these species; we thus separate the descriptions of
the agents below into those not subject to evolutionary
pressure (static agents) and those that do evolve.
1. Static agents
There are six types of agents in our model to which
we do not apply evolutionary pressure. We give a brief
3FIG. 2. In panel A, we display an example orderbook corresponding with a very simple market simulation along with the
resulting asset price time series. We denote bid interest (plotted in blue) by negative numbers (corresponding with positive
Db(x, t) later) and ask interest (plotted in red) by positive numbers (corresponding with positive Da(x, t) later). We display
the time series of total bid and ask interest in panel B and the time series of ∆X in panel C. Differences in total bid and ask
interest are strongly associated with changes in level of ∆X. The periodicity of large drops in
∫
Db(x, t) dx and
∫
Da(x, t) dx
in panel B is due to end-of-day orderbook clearing by the matching engine.
overview of them below (the curious reader is encour-
aged to consult the supplementary information for more
detail).
• Zero-intelligence (ZI): Inspired by work on statis-
tical aspects of asset markets [30, 31], these agents
submit a random bid or ask order with order price
uniformly distributed around the last market price
and number of shares Poisson-distributed around a
fixed value (here set to be 100 shares).
• Zero-intelligence priceless (ZIP): identical to zero-
intelligence agents, except these agents submit
“market” orders — orders that do not have a price
but rather have first-priority execution and execute
against the highest bid (for a market ask) or lowest
ask (for a market bid).
• Momentum (MO): Momentum trading agents pos-
tulate that prices that have recently risen will con-
tinue to rise (and that prices that have recently fall-
en will continue to fall) [32, 33]. Our agents submit
bid orders if the change in price is above some stat-
ic positive threshold and ask orders if the change
in price is below a symmetric negative threshold.
• Mean-reverting (MR): these agents postulate a
return to some mean value of the asset price
[34, 35]. When the asset prices move above a rolling
mean value, these agents submit ask orders; when
the price moves below the rolling mean, they sub-
mit bid orders.
• Market-making (MM): market-making strategies
attempt to profit off of small price imbalances on
either side of the orderbook; in doing so, they pro-
vide liquidity to the asset market [36, 37].
• Fundamental-value (FV): these agents have a cer-
tain fixed price set at which they “believe” the asset
is fairly valued; if the asset price rises above that
fundamental value, they submit ask orders, while
if the asset price falls below it, they submit bid
orders. Note that this approach differs from that
of MR traders since FV traders’ valuations of the
asset do not change over time.
We give more details on the implementation of these
strategies in the supplementary information. Though
this typology of strategies has significant overlap with
that introduced in the context of modern-day futures
markets [38], it also exhibits some differences — in partic-
ular, we do not implement a pure “high-frequency trad-
er” agent since this does not make sense in the context
of an FBA [25, 39]. We implement such a wide variety of
strategies so that, in order for evolving agents to achieve
high fitness, they must perform well in many different
environments. We believe this will increase the likelihood
4of high-fitness agents performing well when confronted
with real price data on which to trade, since real asset
markets are also composed of heterogeneous agents [38].
2. Evolvable agents
We model technologically-advanced agents that are
subject to evolutionary pressure as deep neural networks,
denoted by fθ (we will omit the vector of parameters θ
when it is contextually unnecessary). These neural net-
works take as inputs changes in price, changes in total
orderbook volume, and changes in internal state (cash,
shares held, and profit) and output a three-tuple of side
(bid or ask), number of shares in the order, and price
level of the order:
(st, N
(o)
t ,∆X
(o)
t ) = f(∆X,∆Vˆ
(b),∆Vˆ (a),∆c,∆N,∆pi)
(1)
We briefly describe the inputs of this function and their
derivation from observable market statistics. The change
in asset price from t − 1 to t is given by ∆Xt = Xt −
Xt−1, while the change in cash (∆c), shares (∆N), and
profit (∆pi) are defined analogously. The total bid and
ask interest in the orderbook at time t are given by Vˆ
(b)
t =∫Xt
0
Db(x, t) dx and Vˆ
(a)
t =
∫∞
Xt
Da(x, t) dx respectively;
we then have ∆Vˆ
(b)
t = Vˆ
(b)
t − Vˆ (b)t−1 and ∆Vˆ (a)t = Vˆ (a)t −
Vˆ
(a)
t−1. The neural network is a four-layer feed-forward
model. The two hidden layers have 20 and 10 neurons
respectively, for a total of 383 evolvable parameters in
each neural network [40].
It is an analytical convenience to consider a single gen-
eration of the evolutionary process described in Sec. II C
as a draw from a stochastic function G(α,M), where α
describes the specification of the agents in the model and
M is the evolutionary mechanism (selection and muta-
tion); we will describe these parameters in some detail in
Sec. II C. This function yields orderbooks and price time
series; each call to the function yields a tuple of bid and
ask order density and a price time series,
(Db(x, t), Da(x, t), Xt) = G(α,M). (2)
This way of looking at the process makes it easy to
express Monte Carlo estimates of theoretical quanti-
ties and provides the theoretical basis for conversion of
evolved agents into trading algorithms as we outline in
Sec. II D. We can re-express the above integrals as Monte
Carlo estimates (which is how we compute them in prac-
tice) so that Vˆ
(b)
t ≈
∑
observed bids x′ Db(x
′, t) and Vˆ (a)t ≈∑
observed asks x′ Da(x
′, t), where Db(x, t), Da(x, t), and
Xt are given by Eq. 2. As a visual reference point, in
Panel B of Fig. 2 we display an example realization of
Monte Carlo-approximated ∆Vˆ (b) and ∆Vˆ (a), while in
panel C of this figure we display the corresponding ∆X.
C. Evolutionary dynamics
We provide a summary of the evolutionary dynam-
ics in Fig. 1. We first describe the selection and muta-
tion mechanismM, since this mechanism changes on the
objective of the simulation, and then describe the simula-
tion in general. We set the evolutionary mechanismM to
be either tournament selection-based or the identity (no
evolution): we use the tournament selection mechanism
when we are attempting to evolve agents of high fitness,
while we use the identity mechanism when we are gener-
ating empirical market statistics for use with real data,
as described in Sec. II D.
The tournament selection mechanism is standard [41],
designed as follows: given a population of evolvable
agents, at the end of each generation a tournament of τ
agents is selected from the population at random. We set
τ = 17. These agents are sorted by fitness—their total
profit pi in the market simulation of the past generation—
so that pi(1) ≥ pi(2) ≥ · · · ≥ pi(τ). Agent (i) is select-
ed to remain with probability p(1 − p)i−1, where we set
p = 12 ; the remaining agents are discarded. A total of
τ−1 new agents are initialized with the parameters from
the selected agent (i), denoted by θ(i) = (θ(i),1, ..., θ(i),L)
where the agent has a total of L parameters. These
new parameters are then subjected to centered Gaus-
sian mutation; the parameters of new agent i′ are giv-
en by θi′ = θ(i) + zi′ , where zi′ ∼ N (0, γ2Σ) and we set
γ = 0.1. The covariance matrix Σ of the Gaussian is diag-
onal, with Σ`` = Var(θ(i),`). The τ − 1 agents are added
back into the entire population of evolvable agents for use
in further generations, described in the next paragraph.
At each of g = 1, ..., G generations, we initialize k =
1, ...,K independent markets, which we set to K = 24.
We set G = 100. In each market, we initialize NA agents
with agent parameter vector distributed as (αa,k)a∈A =
αk ∼ p(α), where A is the set of agent types outlined in
Sec. II B. Given a drawn αk, there are αZI,k zero intelli-
gence agents, αMO,k momentum agents, and so on. The
probability distribution p(α) is a joint distribution over
agent types that factors as a uniform distribution over
the number of neural network agents and a multino-
mial distribution over the number of other agents that
is dependent on the number of drawn neural network
agents. Given a number of neural network agents αNN,k
drawn uniformly at random between NNmin and NNmax,
the remaining NA−αNN,k are drawn from a multinomial
distribution with probabilities ρa =
1
6 . We set NNmin = 2
and NNmax = 10. Within each market, agents inter-
act vis-a`-vis the matching engine described in Sec. II A,
trading for a total of T timesteps within each genera-
tion. We set T = 500 and set the number of trading
timesteps per day equal to 100, as outlined in the previ-
ous section. After T timesteps, the population of neural
networks is pooled—removed from each simulation and
collated into one set—and the evolutionary mechanism
M is applied to all ∑Kk=1 αNN,k neural networks, gen-
erating a (partially) new population, as outlined in the
5previous paragraphs of this section. The new population
of neural networks is then shuffled and divided into K
new independent markets according to the αNN,k, along
with new static agents again drawn from the multinomi-
al distribution with equal probabilities, and the process
begins again in generation g + 1.
D. From evolved agent to trading algorithm
We convert evolved neural networks into executable
trading strategies that we subsequently backtest on real
financial data. The major impediment to simply using
the evolved networks as trading strategies is the lack of
readily-available orderbook information for real financial
markets: though such information is available for sale, it
is prohibitively expensive to purchase [42]. Instead, we
use orderbook data generated by G(α,M) as a surrogate
for real orderbook data, which we believe to be an impor-
tant input into the algorithms as orderbook data has
been shown to carry non-zero information about future
prices and be useful in making profitable short-term trad-
ing decisions [43–45]. We reason that, if G(α,M) is a
good simulacrum of the true orderbook-generating pro-
cess active in a real financial market, then the values of
∆Vˆ (b) and ∆Vˆ (a) generated by the agent-based model,
given an observed value of ∆X from a real market, should
be similar to the changes in resting bid and ask volume
that existed in the real market, even though we do not
have access to that data.
Because of our lack of orderbook data, we must simu-
late ∆Vˆ (b) and ∆Vˆ (a) that correspond with the observed
change in price ∆X. To do this, we first simply draw
many values from G(α, id) (the generative model with
no evolutionary mechanism). Then, given ∆X from the
asset market, we draw multiple (∆Vˆ (b), ∆Vˆ (a)) pairs
from their empirical joint pdf conditioned on this obser-
vation, which is generated by the draws from G(α, id):
(∆Vˆ (b),∆Vˆ (a)) ∼ pˆG(α,id)(∆V (b),∆V (a)|∆X), (3)
and evaluate f using the conditional expectation of these
values; this new “marginalized” algorithm is given by
fmarg(∆Xt,∆ct,∆Nt,∆pit)
= f(∆X,E[∆Vˆ (b)|∆X], E[∆Vˆ (a)|∆X],∆c,∆N,∆pi),
(4)
where the expectations are taken under the pdf displayed
in Eq. 3. As with the non-marginalized algorithm f ,
fmarg returns a side, change in shares, and change in
price:
(st, N
(o)
t ,∆X
(o)
t ) = fmarg(∆Xt,∆ct,∆Nt,∆pit). Since
we are backtesting the trading algorithm and hence it
is impossible to perform price discovery, we do not use
∆X
(o)
t . We simply simulate the execution of a mar-
ket buy (st = 1) or sell (st = −1) order for N (o)t spot
contracts of the asset and then update the algorithm’s
internal state. As in the evolutionary process within the
agent-based model, we allow the algorithm to sell short
so that Nt may be negative.
We implement three basic risk management routines
that supervise the execution of the algorithm. These
routines act as “circuit breakers” to halt the algorithm’s
operation if certain risk limits are reached and consist of
two versions of the traders’ adage “cut your losses but let
your winners run,” ensuring that maximum loss is capped
at some user-set limit, and one leverage limit routine that
halts execution if the algorithm is long or short a certain
large number of contracts (we set this number equal to
150) [46]. (The interested reader is referred to the sup-
plementary information for more detail.) Though these
routines pale in comparison with real risk-management
software used in algorithmic trading [47–49], we believe
that they are sufficient for the purposes of this work.
III. RESULTS
A. Evolutionary dynamics
We ran 100 independent simulations of the entire pro-
cess outlined in Sec. II C. This resulted in a total of
240,000 (= 24 independent markets per generation × 100
generations × 100 independent simulations) conditional-
ly independent market simulations from which to sample
evolved neural networks for validation and testing on real
financial asset data. At each generation of each simula-
tion, we saved the best individual for possible further
use.
Evolved neural networks (NN) quickly became the
dominant species of trading agent, though they were not
profitable at g = 0 (at which point they were simply ran-
dom neural networks with normally-distributed weights
and biases). Fig. 3 displays average (solid curves) and
median (dashed curves) wealth trajectories for each agent
type; these statistics are calculated over all simulations
at that generation. The average and median wealth of
NN agents increases quickly until about g = 10. It
then increases more slowly until about g = 40, when
it plateaus. Concomitant with the rise in average and
median NN wealth is a decline in the wealth of nearly
every other agent type. In particular, though fundamen-
tal value (FV) agents started out as the most profitable
agent type (due to their strong beliefs about “true” asset
values and market power; in early generations they had
the ability to collectively set market price), they became
the second-worst performing agent type as NN agents
became more profitable. It is notable that momentum
trading agents are the only static agent type that was
still able to make positive profits during multiple sequen-
tial later generations (in particular g > 30), long after all
other static agents had become, on average, very unprof-
itable. This is consistent with the finding that real asset
prices may exhibit momentum effects and that trading
strategies based on exploiting this momentum may result
in positive expected profit [51].
6FIG. 3. Evolving neural network agents quickly dominate
all static agents; average wealth of neural network agents
increases until about g = 40, where it plateaus while the
average wealth of other static trading agents remains largely
flat or decreases over time. In particular, mean-reverting and
fundamental-value traders suffer large average wealth loss-
es, even though fundamental-value traders start as the most
profitable agent type. We also find that a static momen-
tum trading strategy is, on average, the strategy that is least
dominated by evolving neural networks and can actually be
sustainably profitable for multiple generations; this result cor-
responds with the finding that a momentum-based strategy
can be profitable over nontrivial timescales in real financial
markets [50].
As evolution progressed through generations, statisti-
cal properties of asset price time series Xt changed sig-
nificantly. The mean square deviation (MSD) of Xt in
generation g, defined by the exponent γg in the relation-
ship Eg[(X
(g)
t −µt)2] ∝ tγg where µt is the intertemporal
mean of X
(g)
t , begins in the sub- or normally-diffusive
region (γg ≤ 1) but quickly rises to γg ≈ 1.8 near
g = 10 and remains there for the remainder of evolu-
tionary time. We display the MSD of asset prices by
generation in Fig. 4. MSD that grows superlinearly with
time is termed anomalous superdiffusion [52, 53] and is
commonly observed in real asset markets [54–56]. This
may provide evidence that observed asset price superdif-
fusion in real asset markets is partially driven by purely
endogenous evolutionary dynamics.
FIG. 4. Asset price superdiffusion emerges as a byproduct of
evolutionary pressure. Superdiffusion is defined by a super-
linear relationship between mean squared deviation of a time
series and time itself. At each generation g, we fit a model of
the form E[(X
(g)
t − µt)2] ∝ tγg and plot the resulting γg as a
function of generation g. This exponent of dispersion stabi-
lizes at roughly γg ' 1.8 after approximately 10 generations
of evolution (indicated by the vertical black line at g = 10),
which influences our selection of g = 10 for validation and
testing of evolved strategies on real data.
B. Validation and testing of evolved strategies
We chose a subsample of the neural networks that
we extracted from the market simulations for considera-
tion as algorithmic trading strategies to be used on real
data. Though all evolved neural networks that we saved
had high fitness in the context of the agent-based mod-
el, we hypothesized that it would not be the case that
all of them would have high fitness when backtested on
observed asset price data. We selected the high-fitness
neural networks saved at generation g = 10, the set of
which we will denote by A10, for two reasons. First, this
was the approximate “elbow” of log10 pi, as displayed in
Fig. 3; at generations later than approximately g = 10,
NN agents exhibited decreasing marginal log10 pi. Sec-
ond, this generation was the point at which the expo-
nent of the MSD of asset prices appeared to stabilize at
γg ≈ 1.8.
The asset prices produced by the interaction of agents
in the ABM do not appear to exhibit geometric (multi-
plicative noise) dynamics, but rather arithmetic (additive
noise) dynamics. Though many real financial assets do
exhibit geometric- or geometric-like dynamics [57], oth-
er assets, such as foreign exchange (FX) spot contracts,
7typically display quasi-arithmetic dynamics instead [58].
We thus test our evolved neural networks on FX spot rate
data, eight and a half (January 2015 through July 2019)
years of millisecond-sampled EUR/USD and GBP/USD
spot exchange rate data sourced from an over-the-counter
trading venue [59]. We do not implement transaction
costs in our backtesting as, if these are constant, their
marginal incidence on profit decreases as the amount of
leverage (net number of contracts traded) increases. We
separate this dataset into a validation (2010 - 2015) and
testing (2015 - 2019) split. Although this split is unnec-
essary in the context of overfitting to data (because the
neural networks are just static at this point; their evolu-
tion occurred in the ABM and they do not update their
weights based on the observed FX data), it is part of a
method by which we lower the probability of false pos-
itive discovery of high-performance trading algorithms.
The top k algorithms in A10, ranked by total profit accu-
mulated by trading on validation data, were then used to
trade on the test dataset; if these algorithms accumulated
high profit on the validation dataset by chance, it is likely
that they would not perform well on the test dataset. We
set k = 5 and will denote these “elite” trading strategies
by Aelite.
To create trading algorithms from the evolved neural
networks, we followed the procedure described in Sec.
II D. We resampled the spot FX rate time series at the 10s
resolution, setting as Xt the mean price during that 10s
interval multiplicatively rescaled by a constant (100/X0)
so that the price on the first second of each month was
equal to 100. Agents traded during the first 106 seconds
(approximately 16.2 days[60]) of each month, a number of
timesteps that we chose arbitrarily to avoid possible edge
effects occurring at the end of the month. We will refer
to one 106s time interval of trading on a single spot rate
(EUR/USD or GBP/USD) as a single trading episode.
In Fig. 5, we display an example time series of spot FX
rate (EUR/USD during July of 2016) and corresponding
profit made by an evolved neural network in this trading
episode. In this example, though the spot rate fluctuates
considerably and has |XT − X0| < 0.01 USD/contract,
the profit time series increases fairly steadily throughout
the entire time period, netting a total of piT ≈ 0.125 USD.
Evolved strategies differed significantly from random
neural network strategies. We compared the distribu-
tion of profit on the validation dataset by A10, prof-
it on the test dataset by Aelite, and profit on the test
dataset by 20 random neural network agents (Arandom)
and display empirical cdfs of these distributions, along
with bootstrapped pdfs of the means of these distribu-
tions, in Fig. 6. Elite individuals (the top k = 5 perform-
ers on the validation dataset) have the greatest maxi-
mum absolute difference (Kolmogorov-Smirnov statistic)
between the empirical cdf of their profit and the oth-
er cdfs (D(Aelite,Arandom) = 0.4488, D(Aelite,A10) =
0.3809) while the maximum distance between the empir-
ical cdf of random neural network profit and all evolved
neural network profit was smaller, but still significantly
FIG. 5. Elite evolved trading algorithms are able to obtain
positive profit under a wide variety of backtested trading con-
ditions. These price time series display both large increases
and decreases during this time period, as well as regions of
relatively low and high volatility. Despite these varied condi-
tions, an elite evolved algorithm was able to capture positive
profit (shown in the blue curve) over this time period, show-
ing large gains in profit during both price drawdowns and
ramp-ups. The vertical dashed line in each subplot indicates
that the risk management system halted the execution of the
trading algorithm. In this case, this occurred because the
algorithm attempted to exceed the user-set leverage limit.
greater than zero (D(A10,Arandom) = 0.0956), as demon-
strated in panel A. Though the A10 and Arandom profit
distributions are far more similar to each other than they
are to that of Aelite, they differ significantly in their tails:
the A10 distribution has a higher likelihood of observ-
ing larger losses (though the magnitude of these losses
are still severely damped by the risk management rou-
tines detailed in Sec. II D) and larger gains than does the
Arandom distribution. It is possible this occurred because
many agents in A10 had high fitness in their particular
realization of the ABM with agent concentration vector
α, but α did not resemble the (effectively unobservable)
makeup of agents that generated the real spot price time
series. The mean profit of A10 on validation data was
higher than that of Arandom on test data, though esti-
mates of this mean (displayed in panel B of Fig. 6) have
greater dispersion that estimates of the mean of A10 prof-
it. It is likely (probability ≈ 0.7617) that the true mean
of the A10 profit distribution is greater than the mean
of the Arandom profit distribution. However, distribu-
tions of estimated mean for both sets of agents do contain
zero (though the estimated probabilities that the mean
is greater than zero are 0.7863 for Arandom and 0.9241 for
A10).
Crucially, mean Aelite profit on test data is very far
from zero (approximately 0.267 USD per trading episode)
and the estimated distribution of mean profit is bounded
away from zero. We discuss these results further in the
8FIG. 6. The profit distributions of all evolved neural networks (A10), random neural networks (Arandom), and elite individuals
(Aelite) when evaluated on real FX spot rate data differ significantly, as we demonstrate in panel A. In panel B, we demonstrate
that elite evolved neural network trading strategies have significantly higher mean profits on test data than do random neural
network strategies or the set of all evolved strategies evaluated on validation data. (The separation between validation and test
data is irrelevant for the set of all evolved neural networks, as these networks evolved in the agent-based model, not through
evaluation on real data.) The data do not appear to have a diverging second moment; we do not concern ourselves with issues
that arise with bootstrapping in distributions with tail exponent α < 2 [61].
supplementary information.
IV. DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION
We construct a method to develop ab initio trad-
ing algorithms using an agent-based model of a finan-
cial market. We subject expressive agents to evolution-
ary pressure, using profit generated in the agent-based
model as the fitness function. We then backtest high-
performing agents on real financial asset price data (spot
foreign exchange rates). We further tested “elite” evolved
agents—agents that performed well on validation data
(EUR/USD and GBP/USD from 2010 to 2015)—on test
data, the same currency pairs but during the time inter-
val 2016 through 2019. We find that it is possible for
evolved trading algorithms to make significantly positive
backtesting profit for extended periods of time during
varying market conditions, even though these evolved
algorithms had never experienced real financial data dur-
ing the process of evolution. This result provides evi-
dence that a paradigm shift in the design of automated
trading algorithms— from prediction of future market
states to, instead, closely modeling the underlying mech-
anisms and agents of which the market is composed—
may be both feasible and profitable.
Though this result is promising, it is important to note
some shortcomings of our research and avenues for fur-
ther exploration. First, and most importantly, we have
not actually tested the performance of the “elite” evolved
agents in a real market, but only backtested them on
real market data. The difference between these actions
is profound; the ultimate expression of confidence in a
trading strategy is to use it with one’s own capital and
we have not yet done this [62]. Though the elite agents
are consistently profitable when backtested, this does not
guarantee that they will be profitable when used to trade
“live” in a real financial market. If elite agents generat-
ed according to the methodology laid out in Secs. II C
and II D are profitable when used to trade spot contracts
in foreign exchange markets, we will be more confident
in stating that this methodology is a robust method of
generating ab initio trading algorithms.
Second, our implementations of multiple components
of our methodology were intended as proofs-of-concept;
four-layer feed-forward neural networks are decidedly not
at the cutting-edge of neural network design [63]. Future
work could focus on improving the expressiveness and
realism of agents used in the agent-based model, mod-
ifying the evolvable neural networks to use a recurrent
architecture, using different order types in the matching
engine (and hence increasing dimensionality of the neu-
9ral networks’ action space), and in general attempting to
more closely match the composition of the agent-based
model with the structure of modern-day securities mar-
kets (in particular, spot FX rate markets). We could
also subject other types of agents to moderate evolution-
ary pressure in order to simulate the knowledge dissem-
ination that occurs in communities of relatively static
strategies [64].
Finally, there is substantial room for more analysis of
the free parameters in our agent-based model—for exam-
ple, tuning the parameters of the tournament selection
adaptively so that later generations do not evolve to sim-
ply exploit the structure of the agent-based model but
rather continue to explore novel trading strategies. More
generally, we should improve the design of the mecha-
nism by which we select high-performing individuals from
the model to be backtested on real data. We have used
only a heuristic measure—the apparent stabilization of
the MSD exponent and decreasing marginal log profit—
as indicators as from which generation we should select,
and what follows this is essentially rejection sampling
from the space of agents that are high-performers in the
agent-based model through evaluation of these agents on
validation data. We believe that there are probably bet-
ter ways to implement this step.
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Appendix A: Supplementary information
Algorithmic details of agents
All agents (except for neural network agents) submit a
number of shares that is Poisson distributed with mean
value E[N ] = 100 by default.
• Zero intelligence (ZI): submit bid with probabil-
ity st ∼ Bernoulli(pbid,). We set pbid,= 12 . Order
price is distributed uniformly around the last equi-
librium price from the matching engine, X
(o)
t =
Xt−1 + νut, where ut ∼ U(−1, 1) and ν > 0 is
the so-called “micro-volatility” preference (denot-
ed below by self.vol pref) of the agent [66]. We
have set ν ∼ Exponential(β = 10) in this study.
This random variable is set at runtime and remains
constant for the life of the agent.
• Zero intelligence plus (ZIP): the same as a zero-
intelligence agent except they submit no order
price; their orders are market orders.
• Momentum (MO): these agents implement a very
simple momentum algorithm based on the change
in price between the current price and the last
observed price:
dp = s e l f . l a s t − p # p i s the p r i c e ; s e l f . l a s t i s the l a s t observed p r i c e
i f dp > 0 :
s i d e = ’ ask ’
p r i c e = p + s e l f . dx # s e l f . dx i s a smal l p r i c e increment
e l i f dp < 0 :
s i d e = ’ bid ’
p r i c e = p − s e l f . dx
e l s e :
s i d e = np . random . cho i c e ( [ ’ ask ’ , ’ bid ’ ] )
p r i c e = p
We set the price increment dx = 0.05, but this is
obviously arbitrary. In particular, one could set
this to be a random variable that takes other infor-
mation about market state as parameters.
• Fundamental value: these agents have a “true valu-
ation” estimate of what they think the traded asset
is actually worth. If the price of the asset is below
this value, they submit a bid, while if it is above
this value, they submit an ask.
i f p == orde r s .NaP: # how we denote no p r i c e in fo rmat ion returned by matching eng ine
re turn [ ]
# mean price i s the agent ’ s true−va luat i on es t imate
# p r i c e t o l e r a n c e i s the agent ’ s e s t imate o f e r r o r around the t rue mean p r i c e
# that they are w i l l i n g to accept
e l i f p > s e l f . mean price + s e l f . p r i c e t o l e r a n c e :
s i d e = ’ ask ’
12
p r i c e = p + s e l f . dx + s e l f . v o l p r e f ∗ np . random . random ( ) − s e l f . v o l p r e f / 2 # vo l p r e f i s nu
from above
e l i f p < s e l f . mean price − s e l f . p r i c e t o l e r a n c e :
s i d e = ’ bid ’
p r i c e = p − s e l f . dx + s e l f . v o l p r e f ∗ np . random . random ( ) − s e l f . v o l p r e f / 2
e l s e :
r e turn [ ]
As with any other agent with a vol pref attribute,
this algorithm can be made deterministic by setting
self.vol pref = 0.
• Mean reversion: this agent anticipates a return to
some rolling mean. If the price is higher than the
rolling mean, the agent submits an ask order. If
the price is lower than the rolling mean, it submits
a bid order.
s e l f . p r i c e s [ s e l f . c u r r en t i nd ] = p # a l i s t o f r e c ent p r i c e s
# s e l f . window i s number o f p r i c e s that are s to r ed
s e l f . c u r r en t i nd = ( s e l f . c u r r en t i nd + 1) % s e l f . window
s e l f . mean price = s e l f . p r i c e s [ s e l f . p r i c e s > 0 ] . mean ( )
i f p == orde r s .NaP:
re turn [ ]
e l i f p > s e l f . mean price + s e l f . p r i c e t o l e r a n c e :
s i d e = ’ ask ’
p r i c e = p − s e l f . v o l p r e f ∗ np . random . random ( )
e l i f p < s e l f . mean price − s e l f . p r i c e t o l e r a n c e :
s i d e = ’ bid ’
p r i c e = p + s e l f . v o l p r e f ∗ np . random . random ( )
e l s e :
r e turn [ ]
We set self.window = 50 by default.
• Market making: this agent provides liquidity on
both sides of a limit order book in an attempt to
collect small profits that result from other market
participants crossing the spread. Like the mean
reverting agent, this agent keeps a rolling list of
recent prices to which it refers when calculating
likelihood of price movements.
s e l f . p r i c e s [ s e l f . c u r r en t i nd ] = s e l f . eng ine s [ e id ] . eq # i n t e r f a c i n g with one o f po s s i b l y many
matching eng ines
s e l f . c u r r en t i nd = ( s e l f . c u r r en t i nd + 1) % s e l f . window
p = s e l f . p r i c e s [ s e l f . p r i c e s > 0 ] . mean ( )
# React to inventory imbalance
# t a r g e t i n v e n t o r y s i z e i s g en e r a l l y assumed to be a smal l number
d ive rgence = ( s e l f . s h a r e s h e l d − s e l f . t a r g e t i n v e n t o r y s i z e )
i f d ive rgence > s e l f . i n v en t o r y t o l e r an c e :
s e l f . s h i f t = max(0 . 0 1 , s e l f . s h i f t − 0 . 01 ) # s h i f t s r e f e r e n c e p r i c e
s e l f . spread += 0.01 # s h i f t s how f a r on e i t h e r s i d e o f the equ i l i b r i um the agent w i l l p l ace
o rde r s
e l i f d ive rgence < − s e l f . i n v en t o r y t o l e r an c e :
s e l f . s h i f t += 0.01 # s h i f t p r i c e up
s e l f . spread += 0.01
e l s e :
s e l f . s h i f t = 0 .
s e l f . spread = max(0 . 0 1 , s e l f . spread − 0 . 01 )
Unlike the other agents described, the market- making agent then submits two orders instead of
only one.
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buy order = orde r s . Order (
s e l f . uid ,
f ’ { s e l f . uid}−{ s e l f . order number} ’ ,
’ bid ’ ,
max( i n t ( s e l f . sha re s − d ive rgence ) , 10) , # adapt ive ly c a l c u l a t e number o f sha re s to lower
inventory imbalance
np . round (p − s e l f . spread + s e l f . s h i f t , 2) ,
t im e i n f o r c e =0,
)
s e l f . order number += 1
s e l l o r d e r = orde r s . Order (
s e l f . uid ,
f ’ { s e l f . uid}−{ s e l f . order number} ’ ,
’ ask ’ , max( i n t ( s e l f . sha r e s + dive rgence ) , 10) ,
np . round (p + s e l f . spread + s e l f . s h i f t , 2) ,
t im e i n f o r c e =0,
)
s e l f . order number += 1
Marginalization procedure
We provide more details on how we attempt to
marginalize over unobserved market variables using ana-
logues of those variables generated by the agent-based
model (ABM). Recall from the main paper that we can
view the ABM as a stochastic function G(α,M) that, giv-
en an agent parameter vector α and evolutionary mech-
anism M (which may be the identity mechanism, i.e. no
selection or mutation), generates orderbooks Db(x, t)|α,
Da(x, t)|α and price time series Xt|α. Our first step is
simply to jointly obtain many orderbooks and price time
series by calling G(α,M) many times for a variety of
different α. We then have random fields of orderbooks
Db = {Db(x, t)|α}α, Da = {Da(x, t)|α}α and price time
series X = {Xt|α}α indexed by the vectors α that we
draw from some joint distribution p(α). In our imple-
mentation, we just set p(α) to a multinomial distribution
with equal probabilities of picking each agent type.
We called G(α, id) once for each saved evolved neural
network and added the evolved neural network to the
simulation. Given these random fields of orderbooks
and price time series, we create the price difference
∆X = Xt − Xt−1 and the total resting order volume
time series calculated from the sequence of orderbooks,
∆Vˆ (b) and ∆Vˆ (a), defined analogously. The change in
price does have an observable real market analogue—
the actual change in price of the spot asset—while the
change in resting order volume does not have an observ-
able real market analogue, since we did not have access
to real market orderbook data. We store ∆X in a ball
tree using the `1 distance metric. Given an observed
∆X∗ from real market data, we then query the ball
tree for the indices i1, ..., ik of the nearest k neighbors of
∆X∗, ∆Xi1 , ...,∆Xik and then extract ∆Vˆ
(b)
i1
, ...,∆Vˆ
(b)
ik
and ∆Vˆ
(a)
i1
, ...,∆Vˆ
(a)
ik
. We then approximate the market
(∆V (b),∆V (a))|∆X∗ by the approximation to the con-
ditional expectation given by the result of the nearest-
neighbors query:
∆V (b)|∆X∗ ≈ 1
k
k∑
j=1
∆Vˆ
(b)
ij
, (A1)
∆V (a)|∆X∗ ≈ 1
k
k∑
j=1
∆Vˆ
(a)
ij
. (A2)
The validity of this procedure rests on the degree to which
the mechanics and dynamics of the ABM simulate the
true mechanics and dynamics of the real asset market.
Risk management routines
We implemented some simple risk management rou-
tines to halt the losses of poorly-performing algorithms.
These routines come in three variants: two versions of
the traders’ adage “cut your losses but let your winners
run,” and one version that seeks to limit total leverage
(net open position of spot contracts).
• “Cut losses” algorithm operating on price levels:
halts trading if total profit is below a certain level.
de f c u t l o s s e s (
p r o f i t a r r ,
l ow e r l im i t =−0.5 ,
method=’ abso lu t e ’ ,
r o l l i n d =100 ,
) :
””” Implements the l e v e l−based adage ” cut your l o s s e s and l e t your winners run . ”
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I f the l e v e l o f p r o f i t i s below a c e r t a i n s e t l e v e l , ha l t t rad ing . Otherwise , keep going .
: param p r o f i t a r r : array o f p r o f i t s so f a r
: type p r o f i t a r r : index−ab le
: param l owe r l im i t : the l e v e l o f p r o f i t below which t rad ing should ha l t .
: param method : one o f ‘ abso lute ‘ or ‘ r o l l i n g ‘ , how to c a l c u l a t e the maximum p r o f i t s e t po i n t
: type l ow e r l im i t : ‘ f l o a t ‘
: r e tu rn s : ‘ bool ‘ , whether or not t rad ing should ha l t
”””
i f (method == ’ abso lu te ’ ) or ( l en ( p r o f i t a r r ) <= r o l l i n d ) :
i f p r o f i t a r r [−1] <= l owe r l im i t :
r e turn True
re turn Fa l se
e l i f method == ’ r o l l i n g ’ :
max pro f i t = np .max( p r o f i t a r r [− r o l l i n d : ] )
i f p r o f i t a r r [−1] − l ow e r l im i t < max pro f i t :
r e turn True
re turn Fa l se
e l s e : # they didn ’ t s p e c i f y anything , b e t t e r to ha l t r a the r than propagate t h e i r e r r o r s
re turn True
If method == ’rolling’ and roll ind = 0, this is
equivalent to halting trading at time t if pit is less
than maxt′=1,...,t pit′− lower limit; we used these
parameter settings during our experiments.
• “Cut losses” algorithm operating on changes in
price level: halts trading if ∆pi is less than some
specified cutoff.
de f c u t l o s s e s d e l t a (
p r o f i t a r r ,
l ow e r l im i t =−0.5 ,
) :
””” Implements the f low−based adage ” cut your l o s s e s and l e t your winners run . ”
I f the change in p r o f i t i s below a c e r t a i n s e t l e v e l , ha l t t rad ing . Otherwise , keep going .
: param p r o f i t a r r : array o f p r o f i t s so f a r
: type p r o f i t a r r : index−ab le
: param l owe r l im i t : the l e v e l o f d e l t a p r o f i t below which t rad ing should ha l t .
: type l ow e r l im i t : ‘ f l o a t ‘
: r e tu rn s : ‘ bool ‘ , whether or not t rad ing should ha l t
”””
i f ( l en ( p r o f i t a r r ) >= 2) and ( p r o f i t a r r [−1] − p r o f i t a r r [−2] <= l owe r l im i t ) :
r e turn True
re turn Fa l se
• Leverage limit: if the total number of spot con- tracts (long or short, i.e., positive or negative) is
above a set threshold, halts trading.
de f l im i t l e v e r a g e (
sha r e s a r r ,
max shares=150 ,
) :
i f np . abs ( s h a r e s a r r [−1] ) >= max shares :
r e turn True
re turn Fa l se
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The existence of a risk management routine supervis-
ing an algorithm’s execution will, in general, change the
algorithm’s profit distribution. As an example, sup-
pose that a trading algorithm had zero average profit
E[pi] =
∫∞
−∞ pip(pi) dpi = 0 when unsupervised by a risk
management algorithm. If the risk management algo-
rithm were “perfect” in the sense that it could guarantee
limit loss to no less than −pi∗ for pi∗ > 0, then it is
the case that the trading algorithm would have positive
expected profit, since expected profit is then given by∫ ∞
−∞
max{−pi∗, pi} p(pi) dpi ≥
∫ ∞
−∞
pi p(pi) dpi = 0. (A3)
Profitability of evolved agents
We tested the profitability of all evolved algorithms on
the validation dataset, the currency pairs EUR/USD and
GBP/USD from 1-1-2010 to 12-31-2015, and then tested
the elite evolved algorithms—what we termed the top five
most profitable algorithms on the validation dataset—on
a test dataset, EUR/USD and GBP/USD from 1-1-2016
to 7-1-2019 (the date we collected this data).
Below, we display the distributions of profit by the elite
evolved algorithms on the test dataset. By total profit,
we mean all profit the algorithm earned over all trad-
ing episodes (defined in the main paper) in the test
dataset. The probability of profit, expected profit, and
maximum a-posteriori profit are all measured on a per-
trading-episode basis. The red curve superimposed on
the histogram is a maximum-likelihood estimated lognor-
mal pdf, which fits the observed data fairly well in some
cases and not well in others. We fit a lognormal pdf
as, if profit accumulates via random positive and nega-
tive percentages changes, the lognormal distribution is
the appropriate limiting distribution by the multiplica-
tive CLT (after shifting the distribution by the appropri-
ate location and scale parameters).
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FIG. 7. g = 10, independent simulation 21
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FIG. 8. g = 10, independent simulation 1
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FIG. 9. g = 10, independent simulation 93
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FIG. 10. g = 10, independent simulation 79
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FIG. 11. g = 10, independent simulation 38
